The Future of Political Islam

" As an American I naturally care strongly about the future and welfare of my own country. At the same time I believe that Americas interests, conducted in an enlightened manner, need not differ radically from the interests of most Muslims. After many long years in the Muslim world I am also broadly concerned for the future and welfare of its peoples. This empathy should not render me uncritical of events, trends, or groups there. Nor is this book an apologia for the Muslim world, although a few may consider it so since it attempts to place Islamist politics in a rational light and suggests that not all Muslim grievances are groundless. "  --Graham E. Fuller

The Future of Political Islam
by Graham E. Fuller, Palgrave MacMillan,
(an excerpt from his book with above title)

INTRODUCTION:

WHAT IS POLITICAL ISLAM? How does it act in the world? What challenges does it pose to the world, and what challenges does it face? And finally, where is it headed? These are the fundamental questions
addressed in this book.

These questions became a whole lot less academic with the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which suddenly brought Middle Fast politics home to Americans with a vengeance. What is in many ways a struggle within the Middle East had burst out of its confines to affect everyone. The East and the West are now just beginning a long process of sorting out the repercussions that touch upon the nature of entrenched and ineffective Middle Eastern regimes, their Islamist oppositions, Western hostility, and the presence of terrorist groups feeding off all these problems.

Yet, even as the West demonstrates a new and heightened attention to Islam, a basic ongoing, long-term struggle for the soul of Islam within the Muslim world is also intensifying under the new pressures.
Political Islam is growing, expanding, evolving, and diversifying. And it will be an inevitable if not a dominating feature of politics in the Muslim world for quite some time to come. Islamic terrorism itself may represent only a thin wedge of the overall Islamic political spectrum, but it has the power to set the broader agenda between "Islam and the West" as Usama bin Ladin and the resultant American War Against Terrorism have demonstrated.

Here we must immediately define terms. Islam is a religion. Use of this word applies, properly speaking, only to the religion itself. We cannot accurately say that "Islam is on the march" or that "Islam is anti-Western"; it is rather the practice and activities of Muslims that can be so described. Most of the time we are talking about how Muslims choose to understand what Islam says about a great variety of issues on the practical level.

I use the terms political Islam or Islamism synonymously and extensively throughout the book. Readers should be warned that I define these terms per haps more broadly than some other analysts do, reflecting the reality of the phenomenon. In my view an Islamist is one who believes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to
say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion. The term "political Islam" should be neutral in character, neither pejorative nor judgmental in itself; only upon further definition of the specific views, means, and goals of an Islamist movement in each case can we be critical of the process. I prefer this definition because it is broad enough to capture the full spectrum of Islamist expression that runs the gamut from radical to moderate, violent to peaceful, democratic to authoritarian, traditionalist to modernist.

I also employ the term Islamic fundamentalism, but only to refer to those Islamists who follow a literal and narrow reading of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, who believe they have a monopoly on the sole correct understanding of Islam and demonstrate intolerance toward those who differ. Many fundamentalists will insist on the absolute primary of applying all Islamic laws as the sole touchstone of Islamic legitimacy. Fundamentalism is not the same as traditionalism at all; it can be radical in its departure from the status quo of traditional Islamic understanding and in fact seeks to implement change through a "back to basics" approach. All fundamentalists are Islamists, but not all Islamists are fundamentalist by any means, since Islamism includes those who interpret political Islam in a more modern or liberal sense as well.

THE LURE OF ISLAMIST POLITICS

There are important reasons for examining political Islam-quite apart from trying to understand Middle East terrorism. To the casual observer political Islam may be an exotic and remote world, seemingly locked in
a time warp linked to seventh century values and struggles. The reality is rather different. Islamist politics could not be more central to modern political and social development: Islamists are struggling, like so much of the rest of the developing world, with the genuine dilemmas of modernization: rampant change of daily life and urbanization at all levels, social dislocation and crisis, the destruction of traditional values, the uncertain threats of globalization, the need for representative and competent governance, and the need to build just societies and to cope with formidable political, economic, and cultural challenges from the West. Most Islamists look forward and not backward in the quest to establish a better moral foundation for society in order to confront the demands of contemporary life and globalization.
Their preoccupations reflect the ongoing concerns of much of the rest of the world, even if we are at different stages of managing them. It is a central thesis of this book that political Islam is not an exotic and distant phenomenon, but one intimately linked to contemporary political social economic and moral issues of near universal concern.

We in the West are often uncomfortable with the presence of religion, certainly in the public sphere. Yet a study of religion in society in general compels us to grapple with many of the most  complex, fascinating, revealing, and important issues of contemporary politics.
Religion is intimately linked to human psychology and culture. The history of the human quest to derive philosophical and spiritual meaning out of life provides the raw material for much of the greatest literature, thought, philosophy of history, architecture, art, and music. Religion encompasses our values, aspirations, and vision of
life, our quest to find meaning in our existence, our fears of our mortality, our concerns for what is right and wrong in this world, our aspirations to bring moral values to bear on the construction of our political and societal existence, our quest for spiritual fulfillment on the often trying paths of daily life, our sense of community and our
relations with our fellow men and women, and finally a sense of awe toward creation. All human beings are faced with these issues and are compelled to provide some answers for themselves, including those who do not consider themselves religious. Political Islam is very much at the heart of this quest in the Muslim world. And the superimposition of contentious international geopolitics further complicates and intensifies the expression of political Islam at the local level.

Many in the contemporary post-industrial world have come to express a certain antipathy to religion, especially organized religion, believing it to contain a measure of intolerance and the remnants of human superstitions not yet eliminated by advances in natural science. Yet few can remain indifferent to the issues raised by religion. That the
disputation of religion is generally excluded from the Western salon only underscores the reality of its continuing power as a sensitive and emotive force in human society.

When religion is linked with politics, two of the most vital elements of human concern come together. This conjuncture can be for better or for worse: both religion and politics have consistently exploited each other across the web of history. Indeed, how could politics ever remain indifferent to such a powerful motive force as religion? And how could religion, with its vision of the place of human existence in the grand scheme of things, remain uninterested in the form, expression, and direction of human society and politics?

Americans in particular feel understandable ambivalence about the relationship of religion to politics. The American secular tradition, ironically, is not due to an American indifference to the role of religion in life. On the contrary, it emerged from the concerns of those passionately committed to religion and the preservation of its
diverse forms that brought its adherents early on to the American continent; r goal was precisely to preserve their faith and its expression from the power of the state that had oppressed it back home. America today remains the most religious country in the industrialized world while still broadly committed to separating religion and the
state as much as possible, for the protection of both. Yet the most emotional features of American politics are exactly those that entail religious concerns, even if they are not expressed in explicitly religious terms. The public goes to the barricades as soon as talk turns to abortion or the right to life, euthanasia and the right to die, the understanding and teaching of sexuality, the norms of sexual conduct and its alternative "lifestyles," the dilemma of cheating, the nature of divorce law, single-parent families, the nature and welfare of the family, and the search for the most desirable forms of social organization. These issues are profoundly religious (or moral) in content and character, even if we in the West do not always choose to formulate them in those terms. Islamic politics approach this linkage more directly, unabashedly, and explicitly.

To write about Islam in politics-and politics in Islam, then is to examine the universal phenomenon of religion and politics as it happens to be expressed in the Muslim world. It sheds an indirect light on expression of these same universal is sues in the West as well. And through examination of Islamic fundamentalism we also explore some of
the most sensitive and central features of life in the Muslim world; we gain insights into the political, religious, social, and psychological aspects of Muslim society as a whole. Indeed, the vehicle of political Islam might be one of the very best ways to understand the politics of Muslim world in general-far more revealing than to follow Marxist, socialist, nationalist, or even democratic politics of Muslim societies. The reason is simple: Islam pervades the daily life of Islamic society and political culture more profoundly than any other single ideological or conceptual force.

The entire issue of relations between Islam and the West forces us to explore comparative civilizations, the reasons for their rise and fall, and the interactions among them. How do we explain a period of one thousand years when Islam was the preeminent world civilization, only to founder in the face of a newly ascendant West? To the West, history of course "ends" with the universal supremacy of the Western ideals. Yet any historian would be loath to make such an assumption, and indeed many Muslims today ponder the possibility of a time when the balance
between the two civilizations will be restored-or even reversed.

ISLAMISM AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

One of the most striking features of Islamist politics today is the extraordinary pace and speed of its evolution. If this book had been written even a decade ago there would be numerous questions about the direction of its evolution-on issues such as democracy, civil society, parliaments, and political parties-that are now dearer, making it easier to sense their trajectory.

In fact, political Islam is probably the fastest moving force in politics in the Muslim world today. While the thinking of Western-educated Muslim elites may be quite sophisticated, such groups represent only a thin veneer of the broader political order and do not yet have serious mass impact. They speak a Westernized language that is
not yet part of the normal flow of mass political discourse. Ironically it is often through an Islamise framework today that mass political thinking is advanced on questions of just government, representative, responsible and answerable government, and the techniques of mass mobilization for political ends. At the same time some of these movements can also be a force for intolerance, authoritarian impulses, and even great violence.

ABOUT THE BOOK

This book is ultimately about the future. Does political Islam represent the last heroic stand of Muslim cultural resistance to galloping globalization with an American accent? Or does it represent the beginning of a new synthesis of Islam with con temperament, enabling Muslim society and culture to move into the new millennium
more confident of its own cultural foundations?

Throughout the book I emphasize the striking feature of the youthfulness of Islam in modern politics: we are talking about movements that have been important on the political scene for only a few decades (even if a few go back well into the last century) and that have been rapidly evolving over that period. Some of these movements
may turn out to be as evanescent as a meteor in the night sky arresting while visible but soon gone and forgotten. But half a century hence, what will we identify as having been the truly determinative elements in the history of political Islam? Indeed, will political Islam itself turn out to be only a transitional phenomenon in the Muslim world
during a certain difficult phase of its development? Present difficulties have indeed contributed to its rise. Will it be viewed as having been a bad experiment, best forgotten? Or a seminal development leading to profound and necessary long-range change? Given the profusion of these movements, some will indeed be viewed as serious
failures, others as evolving in useful new directions of benefit to society. The answers to these questions are not yet fully clear, but the impact of these movements are already evident, and so far few alternative parties have emerged to seriously rival the Islamists.

This book examines the broad phenomenon of Islamist movements across the Muslim world. I offer a number of hypotheses on the long-range future of Islamist movements, both within the Muslim world and in the larger global context of competing ideas. This book does not represent an exercise in formal academic comparative politics. It is precisely the differing specific characteristics that spring from a unique time, place, history, set of leaders and personalities, and the ultimate conjuncture of all these factors that lend the spark of life, character, behavior, and reality to each of these movements.
Generalizations, to be of value, must not strip off too many of these aspects of uniqueness, for they are what determine the difference, yet regrettably, in a book of this scope, the case studies that in formed my views cannot find space.

I focus on what I believe to be the most interesting, distinctive, important, and revealing aspects of this phenomenon, hoping to uncover some general trends or useful insights from a net deliberately cast
wide. For a single author to seek to write about Islamist politics across the whole Muslim world in one sense may be a little presumptuous or foolhardy. No one can be an expert on the details of the political orders of all of these countries. Yet a single author representing a single vision can perhaps bring greater synthesis to the material than
a multi authored volume can. That is at once this books greatest strength and weakness. A dozen or more books by single authors coping with the totality of this same problem would be of great value to all of us.

The book makes no pretense of "mastering the literature" on the topic-that would be nigh impossible-nor does it attempt to place itself within the corpus of academic writing on the topic. Such contributions are undoubtedly valuable, but that is not my contribution.

The book reflects not merely the examination of writings on Islam but a lot of personal experience living some fourteen years in five different countries in the Muslim world supplemented by visits to every single Muslim country (including the Muslim areas of the former Soviet Union and China), often repeatedly and for long periods. The one glaring lacuna in this book is the absence of treatment of sub-Saharan Africa, not due to any lack of interest but simply the result of imitations on time, energy, and finances. I know I am losing some critically
important insights into alternative forms of Islamic practice as seen in Africa. Perhaps a later edition might rectify this serious omission.

I have also maintained a wealth of close personal friendships with Muslims almost all of my life as well as a great love of the languages, cultures, literature, foods, music, films and arts of the Muslim world. I believe culture is at least as revealing as is political science in understanding how societies function. As vice-chairman of the National
Intelligence Council at the CIA in the 1980s I was responsible for long-range global forecasting, which sparked my interest in the challenge and analytic benefits of looking speculatively into the future. The effort of looking into alternative futures is essentially the function of the historian: it involves examining the past and trying to identify those trends and realities that might be projected into the future in some form. This book does not, of course, represent a dear-cut, single "prediction" about the future of the Muslim world at all, but it does offer a number of hypotheses about how to think about the problem.

MY AGENDA

I would like to offer a few words about what my "agenda" might be in writing this book, because from experience I know that others will attribute one to me in y case. My years as a CIA staff officer have predisposed many, especially in the developing world; to believe that "once an intelligence officer, always an intelligence officer," even
though I abandoned government service some fifteen years ago. More to the point, many foreigners believe that my views somehow represent CIA or U.S. government views of the issues. I wish they did. I would be delighted if my views on these topics had more impact on the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, or any others in a policy role anywhere, but I am under no illusion that the views expressed here are especially congenial to current policy circles.

As an American I naturally care strongly about the future and welfare of my own country. At the same time I believe that Americas interests, conducted in an enlightened manner, need not differ radically from the interests of most Muslims. After many long years in the Muslim world I am also broadly concerned for the future and welfare of its peoples.
This empathy should not render me uncritical of events, trends, or groups there. Nor is this book an apologia for the Muslim world, although a few may consider it so since it attempts to place Islamist politics in a rational light and suggests that not all Muslim grievances are groundless. Furthermore, there will be many Muslims who
believe I am wrong in my understanding of their society or what constitutes their welfare. They may be right. But some element of empathy on the part of the analyst is essential if one is to understand the outlook and psychology of various forms of Islamists. Most Islamist views are far from crazy, marginalized, alien, or primitive at all, but
quite rational within the context of local conditions and problems, even if these views are not always correct or successful.

I take most of the various missions of political Islam as worthy of serious consideration In aspiring to apply Muslim values to the new modern democratic order. I am willing to hear out the Islamists-at least initially-and to try to see the world through their eyes in line with their aspirations rather than impose some preconceived body of
Western notions as the basis of judgment. I do not reject out of hand their experiment, even if I personally have some serious reservations about their chances of success. A willingness to listen to them sympathetically in no way excludes the right to criticize their record to date, to point out their failures and problems they face. Will these movements in fact be able to answer many of the major needs of Muslim societies of the future? I believe they should be afforded the opportunity to express their views, to articulate their programs, and to try to implement many of their ideas as long as they do not violate basic norms of contemporary international society. Indeed many have already violated several basic norms of international society, but in this they are joined by large numbers of other non-Muslim movements, parties, and regimes in the developing world. Some have already failed
miserably and deserve outright condemnation, such as the Taleban in Afghanistan and indiscriminately violent groups like Islamic Jihad in Egypt, the GIA in Algeria, and above all the murderous al-Qaida-organizations that have made no political contribution other than to spill blood and polarize cultures.

Other Islamist movements are still evolving and deserve watching. Many of them can be excluded from the political process in the Muslim world only at high political cost since their roots are deep and linked to Islamic culture. They speak to. problems and grievances that seek a vehicle of expression and that call for a program of action. They will not go away. Islamism happens to be the most current of those vehicles.
The ultimate challenge is how to seek ways in which political integration of Islamism into the current political orders might be possible. Where movements are evolving, even out of unsuccessful or unwise early beginnings, they need to be i given a chance to prove-or disprove-themselves until the world has a better sense about where they are going. I do not believe that the majority of Islamist movements by definition represent a dangerous and noxious ideology that must be repressed. A few by their actions do. But to stifle them all across the board today will only invite heightened confrontation and instability across the Muslim world.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The first chapter of the book discusses the "anguish" of Islamic history, nostalgia for what Muslims see as a glorious past of power and civilizational accomplishment, followed by a period of severe decline into backwardness and even marginalization. What went wrong, why, and what are the implications for future action? I also examine the trajectory of Islamic history through the last century to indicate its remarkable evolution and possible directions of change.

Chapter two is entitled "The Uses of Political Islam," suggesting the multiple roles that political Islam plays today across diverse societies. Not all of these roles are obvious to most Western observers. It is these multiple roles that also serve to guarantee political Islam a central role in Muslim world politics for some time to come.

Chapter three discusses "Islamic polarities"-how might we categorize Islamist movements in a few respects-particularly in terms of the two poles of radical/fundamentalist Islamism versus modernist or "liberal"
Islamism.

Chapter four places Islam in the context of global politics. I contend that political Islam in no way represents an exotic aberration in world politics but rather bears close resemblance to most of the mainstream political movements and debates today across the developing world.

Chapter five discusses Islamism and terrorism and ways to think about the relationship between the two.

Chapter six looks at "Islamism in Power"-the cases of Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan and a brief summary of their experiences to date. How does one assess their success or failure, who is the judge of this performance, and how is it affected by international politics?

Chapter seven focuses upon the behavior of Islamism as it operates in democratic and quasi-democratic orders. I argue that Islamist movements increasingly accept the "universality of democracy, seek to become part of the democratic order, and believe that they will benefit from this kind of political order. As they become integrated into the system, they lose much of their ideological fervor and take on the characteristics of "normal" political parties. But this liberalizing trend is not universal, and there are some disturbing countertrends and genuine problems that these movements face in accommodating themselves to the philosophy of democratic governance.

Chapter eight looks at the problem of "Islam and the West"-a key determinant of the future of Islamist movements. Are we talking about a "clash of civilizations"? What are the concrete factors that drive this
relationship? I suggest that Islam operates more as a vehicle of conflict rather than serving as the source of that conflict.

Chapter nine discusses the key determinative factors, domestic and international, that will influence the future of political Islam.

Chapter ten concludes with an examination of the future of Islamism, alternative paths of development for it, and the key problems these movements face.