Al-Huda
Foundation, NJ U. S. A
the Message Continues ... 7/121
Newsletter for September 2011
Article 1 - Article 2 - Article 3 - Article 4 - Article 5 - Article 6 - Article 7 - Article 8 - Article 9 - Article 10 - Article 11 - Article 12
Contemporary
Problems of Christian Theology and Islamic Thought
by Muhammad Legenhausen
Theology begins
with the question of God. This is true for all the major
theistic theological traditions: Jewish, Christian and Muslim.
Typically, the theologian assumes that his readers believe in
the faith he intends to systematize, defend, and elaborate. He
assumes that they know who God is, and believe in Him. His task
is to rationalize this faith, first be demonstrating God's
existence.
In modern Christian theology, however, one finds much hesitation
and doubt about whether this first theological task is at all
appropriate. The particular arguments presented by Maimonides,
Aquinas and Ibn Sina have come under philosophical attack, and
more fundamentally, the methods of demonstration employed by
them have been attacked. Since the Reformation, there has been
much doubt about the relevance of Greek logic and metaphysics to
the project of elaborating the Christian faith.
Similar doubts have become widespread in the Muslim world. Even
among the Shi'ah, who have continued to nurture a philosophical
or theosophical tradition, there are many who consider this
tradition of thought inappropriate as a ground of doctrine. This
sort of opposition to philosophy has a long history among the
Shi'ah, and has been mounted by some `urafa, muhadithin,
akhbariyyun, and most recently by the maktab-e tafkik.
[12] Muslim
detractors of philosophy, however, have not offered very much as
an alternative to the philosophical groundwork for faith, but
have tended to assume an innate acceptance of its basic
elements.
The criticism of philosophy among Muslim thinkers is further
complicated by two factors. First, what is generally criticized
is the specific philosophical tradition in Islamic thought
stemming from the works of Ibn Sind, Sohravardi and Sadr al-Muta'alihin.
This leaves open the possibility of a philosophical
systematization of the faith along other lines. So, the second
complication is the readiness of many critics of philosophy to
elaborate philosophical theologies of their own. The classic
example of this movement is Ghazali's repudiation of philosophy
and his own philosophical elaboration of his creed, replete with
proofs for the existence of God, for His uniqueness, and for
various divine attributes.
Likewise, sufis in the tradition of Ibn 'Arabi have entered into
a philosophical dialogue with peripatetic philosophy in which
they have offered their own system of thought as a rational
alternative to that of the philosophers, while retaining the
methods of demonstration and many of the concepts employed by
their opponents. Two brilliant examples of this trend are `Abd
al-Rahman Jami's Al-Durrah al-Fakhirah and the correspondence
between Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi and Sadr al-Din Qunawi.
However, because of the ongoing and ever increasing
confrontation with Western thought and culture, doubts are
raised about the entire enterprise of rational systematic
theology. These doubts have a specific significance in the
Western world due to the historical movement from the
Reformation, through the Enlightenment, to modern and postmodern
thought. In the world of Islam, on the other hand, the
significance of such doubts is radically altered by the fact
that they are a foreign import in many ways at odds with the
entire tradition of Islamic theology. It is true that some
Muslims have demanded reliance on the Qur'an and ahadith without
the interference of rational demonstration in ways strikingly
similar to the demands of Christian reformers, but the evolution
of the rejection of philosophical theology in Christian thought
has led to a style of Christian theology that has no counterpart
in Islam; and additionally, the philosophical grounds for
rejecting any form of rational theology in the West are to be
found in schools of thought as diverse as existentialism and
scientific realism, all of which enter discussions among Muslims
as aliens.
Philosophical reflection, at least in a broad sense not limited
to any specific school, has seemed to most Muslim theologians to
be encouraged by the Qur'an and ahadith, especially as
interpreted by the Shi'ah. The Qur'an is replete with
exhortations to reflect upon its signs (ayat), such as Behold!
How repeatedly we display the signs that they may understand.
(6:65), and remonstrations against those who fail to reason,
such as Indeed, We have created for hell many of the jinn and
the men; they have hearts with which they do not understand...
(7:179). Because of the abundance of such verses,
[13] it becomes
impossible to justify a thorough anti-intellectualism on
religious grounds in the context of Islamic culture. Muslim
thinkers have not only taken encouragement from Islam to engage
in intellectual pursuits, they have understood such ayat as
those mentioned above as a divine invitation to employ
philosophical reflection for the purpose of understanding the
Qur'an and ahadith. Wisdom is prized by Muslims because the
Qur'an itself proclaims, He grants wisdom to whomever He wills,
and he who has been granted wisdom has been given abundant good;
and none shall mind it save those endowed with wisdom. (2:269).
Muslims may differ over how the term hikmah is to be interpreted
in this ayah, and even if most will agree that it does not refer
to the specific tradition of philosophical thought that has
emerged through the centuries in Islamic thought, few will deny
that intellectual reflection is accorded great religious value
in Islam.
Likewise, there is a veritable ocean of narrations attributed to
the Prophet' and Imamstextolling the intellectual virtues of
wisdom, knowledge and reason. For example, it is reported that
the Prophet' said, "The virtue of knowledge is more beloved to
Allah than the virtue of worship".
[14] As with the Qur'an, the narrations both encourage the use of the intellect and pose problems for philosophical reflection. Muslim sages have made use of philosophical terms for the rational investigation of religion, and they have used terms drawn from the religious sources to articulate their philosophical reflections.
[15] They have
been inspired by the Qur'an and ahadith to develop various
philosophical ideas, and they have used philosophical ideas
drawn from a variety of sources as aids to the understanding of
scripture.
In the context of this sacred value placed on knowledge and the
intellect, there remains plenty of room for discussion about
what kinds of knowledge and wisdom are to be valued, what the
intellect is and what are its functions. Muslim critics of
philosophy may argue that philosophy has been used
inappropriately to interpret scripture, or that it is sorely
limited and must be supplemented by imagination to provide any
understanding of religious topics, or that its demonstrations
serve only as allusions to the divine. These sorts of points
arise from within Islamic culture where they have been and
continue to be debated. The Western critiques of natural
theology have an entirely different flavor. Islamic culture has
not produced a concept of Iman like that of Christian faith as
the latter is taken to stand independent of and beyond reason
and knowledge. Islamic culture has not produced any sort of
theological antirealism of the sort debated in Western circles.
Islamic thought has not given rise to the atheism and
agnosticism that have emerged from Christian culture and whose
religious significance continues to be discussed by Christian
theologians and philosophers.
For these and many other reasons, Western theological concerns
arrive on the shores of the world of Islam as an invasion. The
Muslim response
often seems as pointless as that of a person who argues with the
newscasters on television. Despite all the talk about interfaith
dialogue, the dynamics of the ways in which the world of Islam
confronts the West force Muslim intellectuals to consider
Western ideas
very seriously, even if the engagement is accompanied by anxiety
and apprehension, while Western thinkers are generally quite
content to
ignore what goes on in the intellectual third world. Islamic
theological reflection is, shunted off as a specialty item for
connoisseurs of esoteric. Dialogue is thus stifled, not because
of ill will per se, but because there is no demand and no
pressing need for Westerners to listen to Muslims, while Muslims
cannot avoid listening to the Western discussions with which the
entire world seems to reverberate.
One reaction this situation has provoked among some Muslims is a
retreat into tradition. The glories of the past are recounted
and
redoubled with a firm intention to abandon the Satanic modern
world in favor of a puritanical return to the pristine Islam of
days gone by.
This reaction is resisted by Muslims who would prove that Islam
is perfectly well suited to serve as an ideology for the
development of
modern societies. There can be no escape from the repetitive
counterpoint of these attitudes in social-religious thinking at
least
until the impact of Western thought in the Islamic world is
sufficiently understood, accepted for what it is, and met by
constructive critique and synthesis in harmony with the
evolution of contemporary Islamic theology.
The heart and soul of the Muslim world is thoroughly imbued with
religion. If Muslims are not to lose heart and lose their souls,
the
task of rational reflection on religion must be taken up again
with full awareness of all the currents of thought that wash
across the
contemporary world of Islam.
The West must be understood not only as cultural invader, but as
itself tormented by the twists of modern and postmodern thought
that have led it to the verge of nihilism in more than one
guise. In order for Muslims to orient themselves in the
contemporary world, religion must
be seen not as something to be merely defended, but as offering
a way forward with valuable guidance for all of humanity. We
cannot ourselves
be saved unless we can invite the entire world to salvation, and
before we can offer anything inviting, we need to understand the
differences
in our cultural and intellectual climates as well as the common
problems they face. The invitation to salvation extended by
Muslims
need not take the form of offering a choice between death and
Islam; what I mean by this is that we should not take the
attitude that for
the Muslim invitation to salvation to be successful it must
result in formal conversion to the religion of Islam as ordained
by Allah,
subhanna wa ta'ala, through His final Prophet ('s). The Qur'an
itself tells us to address the People of the Book in an effort
to come to a
common word upon which we can agree.
[16] The common
word to which we invite the People of the Book must itself be
understood as a means of salvation, at least in the sense that
it offers a way out of the wretchedness faced by those who would
deny it. In order for us to be
saved, we must be able to understand from what it is we wish to
be saved, and how religion may save us from it. From an
eschatological
point of view, salvation means escape from the fire of hell, but
the power of this image should not cause us to neglect the
worldly failings
which culminate in hell and are presaged in the ugliness and
cruelty the world too often manifests.
Despite all its secularism, the Western world is the inheritor
of Christendom. Its values are rooted in references to divinity.
The
United States, for example, was built on foundations laid by
those who had attempted to convene theocracies in the new
colonies. So, the loss
of certainty about God, let alone the idea of the death of God,
threatens to undermine the humanity of Western man, unless some
foundation for human values can be found to replace the
theological structures many would be happy to see left in ruins.
This is reason enough for some Christians to seek to preserve
their faith in God. But while it may provide sufficient
motivation for the
attempt, it cannot by itself provide answers to is the
intellectual doubts that pervade contemporary Western culture.
In addition to the doubts about God raised by philosophers
primarily in criticisms of the proofs for His existence, the
doubts raised by social
critics have had a greater influence on the secularization of
Western culture. While Voltaire (16941778) accepted that the
concept of God was
needed to maintain social order in his remark that if God did
not exist it would be necessary to create Him, the Russian
anarchist Mikhail
Bakunin (1814-1876) exclaimed that if God did exist it would be
necessary to destroy Him, because so much oppression had been
carried
out in His Name. If Voltaire's remark suggests that God may be
little more than a convenient fiction, Bakunin suggests that the
fiction may
be quite inconvenient. The Marxist critique of religion has also
been accepted by many who are skeptical of other aspects of
Marxist
doctrine. Today some feminists object to the concept of God as a
prop for patriarchy, and homosexuals complain that prejudice
against them is
maintained by reference to God. In general, such thinkers quite
correctly realize that an orientation toward God serves as a
constraint
on the satisfaction of various human desires, and is
incompatible with what many consider to be of utmost value.
Western thought is caught between two competing claims to moral
allegiance. On the one hand, there is the transcendent God Who
demands
absolute obedience as the ultimate authority. On the other hand,
there is a secular ethos based on the values of human freedom
and
self-determination. Western religious liberals attempt an
awkward compromise that would coerce the divine will to conform
to humanistic
values. Moral direction is derived from the human, and then the
transcendent God is called in and would be forced into
complicity. He
is allowed to stand above the world, but not to interfere with
human judgments about what is right and wrong. Deist theology is
at least
honest about this.
In Muslim culture, on the other hand, reference to God does not
occur in the context of the doubts and secular values that
plague the West,
or at least not to the same extent. The major form in which
secular values come into conflict with Islam is in the form of
nationalism.
Muslim intellectuals often see themselves as Arabs or Iranians
or Indonesians or whatever, and only then as Muslims. Sometimes
Islam is
only accepted as an expression of national culture. They seek
direction in life in terms of the historical development of
their people or
nation, and relegate religion to the private sphere of personal
spirituality and ceremonies, on the model of what they perceive
to be
the role of religion in technologically advanced societies. The
conflict is between religious and secular ideology, which
usually is
discussed in terms of the scope of religion, but there is little
of the direct confrontation with God common in the West. There
is no death of
God theology among Muslims.
Muslim modernists may advance harsh criticisms of Islam as it
has been understood within their traditions, but they are not
willing to extend
the criticism to God Himself. Western angst about God has not
taken root in the world of Islam, al-hamdu liAllah, and
questions about how
to justify belief in God, which have figured so prominently in
recent Western philosophy of religion, appear curiously
irrelevant to the
primary theological concerns of Muslims.
Nevertheless, Muslim theology must begin to consider seriously
the problems of Western philosophy of religion if Islam is to be
presented
as a way of salvation for all people, including those of the
West. We can no longer rest content with the traditional proofs
because the
standards of reason to which they appeal are no longer
universally accepted. This does not mean that traditional
Islamic theology and
philosophy can or should be simply swept aside; rather the
issues of theology require a more fundamentally critical
treatment than they are
usually given. We need to begin by considering how the basic
concepts of theology, concepts of God, man and the world, are
treated in Islam
and in Christian culture, and how rational reflection on these
concepts and their different treatments in the Islamic and
Christian traditions
can help us to clear a path to theological understanding.
This means that our standards of rationality themselves must be
subject to critical review and evaluation. The roots of the most
profound
doubts about religious reason lie in the success of the
empirical sciences and technology as they have developed in the
West. When it is
observed that the standards of reasoning employed in the
sciences differ markedly from those used by theologians, it is
natural to wonder
if the former cannot suffice for all human purposes. The
vindication of theological reasoning requires an explanation of
how the progress of
the natural sciences can be justified in its own terms. Theology
can no longer afford to ignore the philosophy of science.
Religion declares
that God is the creator of the natural world. So, the methods
that have been successfully used to unlock the secrets of the
natural world must
be understood as revealing the workings of His creation, at
least on some level. What is needed, as Seyyed Hossein Nasr puts
it, is a sacred
science.
[17] Until a way
is found to elaborate an understanding of the natural sciences
as sacred, as governed by standards of reasoning
which are a branch of the more encompassing methods of rational
reflection that apply to theology and philosophy as well as to
mathematics, physics, medicine and cognitive science, theology
will remain susceptible to the charge that its concerns are
peripheral, or
may be safely dismissed. Furthermore, since theology must draw
upon the imagination as well as reason, it must show how its
imaginative work
can enlighten and deepen the dry findings of empirical research
and applied mathematics.
The elaboration of the sciences as sacred does not require an
uncritical acceptance of all that has been accomplished by
secular
science; to the contrary, it is through critical appraisal that
the call for sacred science is to be vindicated. The program,
however, must
aim at integration rather than isolation and protection, for the
strategy of isolating and protecting religion from critical
confrontation with other areas of human knowledge has been
largely responsible for the marginalization of religion in
Western societies.
Traditional formulations of theology, whether Jewish, Christian,
Muslim or Hindu, have not limited themselves to discussions of
divinity; they
have included cosmology as well. The theological affirmation of
sacred cosmology must be regained in the encounter with modern
science for
theology to remain sound, for classical theological cosmologies
have always freely made use of the current sciences of their
times without
entering into the details of astronomical data. Often, more than
the basic outlines of religious cosmologies formulated under the
assumption of a geocentric universe can be revised to accord
with post-Copernican theories, because religious cosmologies are
mostly concerned with the world as the creation and sign of God,
regardless of its physical shape. Nevertheless, the physical
shape of the cosmos assumed in the past was taken to have a
symbolic value in harmony with the religious point of view, and
this has not yet been recovered.
The legacy of theology is no less one of anthropology than
cosmology. If the modern natural sciences have posed a challenge
to theology's concern with cosmology, the modern human sciences
threaten its anthropology. Indeed, anti-religious sentiments are
much more prevalent among psychologists and sociologists than
among physical scientists.
[18] Islam
portrays man as a theomorphic being who due to negligence has
fallen astray from his divine aim, and who has accepted a
covenant with God by means of which he may obtain divine
guidance to his own felicity through the reminders sent by God
with His prophets (may the peace and benedictions of Allah be
with Muhammad and his folk, and with them). This religious
anthropology is not merely descriptive; it has practical
implications for how we are to live, how we are to orient
ourselves, how we may truly serve God. Morals and politics thus
become as central to theology as its more theoretical claims
about human and divine nature.
Here religion must confront the social critics mentioned
earlier. If they have raised doubts about God on the basis of
secular human values, the theologian must find a way to
introduce religious values. In Islam this introduction has two
dimensions with infinite ramifications: the exterior and the
interior, zahir and batin, whose first division is that of
shari'ah and tariqah. Shari'ah is the exterior way, which
includes Islamic law. The law itself is infused with values, for
it tells us how we are to conduct ourselves in worship and in
our dealings with others. It points toward an ideal of human
flourishing in religious community under divine covenant in
which the individual aspires to the complete submission of his
or her own self in conformity with the law. Attention to the
detail of the law is not a cold legalism by which the right to
salvation is purchased, but a reflection of the pious heart
seeking the completeness of submission to God. This means that
the law itself is not to be understood as a mere canon of
regulations, but as infused with value as the outward
realization of the inner quest for the divine.
The inner quest itself is called tariqah, which, like shari'ah
also means way or path. The verbal synonymy of these two terms
indicates the inseparability of the inner and outward aspects of
religion: it is logically impossible to walk down one without
treading upon the other, for both are merely different names or
aspects of divine guidance. The inner quest cannot take shape
except within the framework of the outward precepts of religion;
and the divine law becomes an empty formalism unless its
observance is the outward expression of taqwa, the God-wariness
described by Him, the Exalted, as the best provision for
spiritual wayfaring: And make provision, and verily the best
provision is taqwa (2:197)
The inner way or tariqah is a quest with various stages along
which one must pass, and the arrival at each station requires
acquisition of a specific virtue. Here the world appears as the
ground to be covered, the battlefield for the greatest jihad,
the struggle against the self. Man is understood not as a static
essence, but as in a dynamic condition of transformation, or, in
the terminology of Sadr al-Muta'alihln, substantial motion,
whose human culmination is the perfected human being, insan
kamil, the polished mirror of God, for whom the world itself is
also transformed so that God is seen in all things.
The second division of exterior/interior involves the
recognition that shari'ah and tariqah themselves each have
exterior and interior aspects. For shari'ah there is the
external form of the law and the inward submission to it. The
inward submission to the law is perfected through tariqah, whose
outward expression takes the form of the spiritual instructions
given by the guide to the aspirant and whose inward form is the
spiritual wayfaring itself, the passing through stations and
states and the acquisition of virtue.
So, we find that Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, teaches
of God and man and the world. Its theology includes cosmology
and anthropology. The anthropological aspect has both
theoretical and practical dimensions, and the practical has both
exterior and interior through each of which, especially the
latter, the concepts of God, the world and humanity are informed
and deepened.
It is through this circle of ever deepening insight that Islam
presents its own perspective on the most fundamental questions
posed by man in
every age. The questions are answered by drawing the questioner
into a whirlpool of rational reflection, insight, value and
practice. On the
social level, the drawing in gives unity to the Muslim
community, symbolized by the circumambulation of the Ka'abah
during hajj. This is
where the individual as well as the community focus themselves.
So too, theological work must begin with its orientation toward
God, circle
about the related concepts of humanity and the world, and end,
finally, with reference to Him, glory be to Him!
Theology presents itself in two modes. First, theology is
doctrinal. It elaborates and systematizes credal statements.
Secondly, theology is suggestive. It recommends the acceptance
of its creedal statements. We could put this another way by
contrasting descriptive theology with prescriptive or normative
theology. Descriptive or doctrinal theology is comparatively
straightforward. Here we are busy with the attempt to understand
the teachings of a religion, or the teachings of various
interpreters of the religion, its theologians, exegetes and
Gnostics.
Normative theology is more difficult, because the standards of
assessment immediately come into question. Traditionally the
normative weight of theological reflection has been sought in
the force of logical necessity. One must accept the claims of
the theologian or suffer the eternal pain of contradiction.
Whoever fails to accept the results of theological reasoning is
threatened with the loss of his humanity, for humanity is
defined in terms of the reason upon which the theologian rests
his case. This sort of approach seems offensively authoritarian
to modern sensibilities, although why this should be so is
seldom considered. Mathematicians and philosophers often present
their results as the dictates of more or less pure reason, and
no offense is taken, not even by the most liberal of Christians.
So why should anyone be insulted or offended when the same sorts
of methods are applied to religion? The answer to this question
will be found when it is understood that the standards of
reasoning employed by traditional theology have become subject
of dispute. The sorts of arguments and the methods of reasoning
about theological topics whose validity has been considered
obvious in the Islamic traditions of theological reflection
often fail to persuade those nurtured in modern Western culture.
Insistence on the obviousness or self evidence of our own
standards of reasoning provides no remedy to this impasse. Our
theological writings must offer those who do not share our views
a way in, and we will not be able to provide such a port of
entry until we become familiar with the intellectual geography
of the points of embarkation of those whom we would have enter
into conversation with us. If there is no common ground of
sufficient breadth for meaningful discussion to take place, such
ground will have to be constructed. Our language and the ways in
which we use it to express our rational reflections will have to
be expanded to the point that we are able to explain the views
we oppose and why we oppose them, and at the same time are able
to recast the claims of our own traditions of Islamic thought in
forms accessible and attractive to others.
If we are to accomplish this task of constructing a normative
Islamic theology through which the world may be invited to
salvation, even though the world is largely intoxicated with
modern or postmodern secular Western culture, a good place for
us to begin work is by looking at the problems of Christian
theology. Christian theology has been attempting to respond to
modern currents of Western thought for a long time. We should be
willing to learn from its successes and failures. At the same
time, many of the problems of Christian theology are familiar to
Muslims. How are we to explain divine knowledge, evil, the
creation of the world out of nothing, life after death, and most
of the other facets of our creed? For most of the topics to be
found in Islamic theology, discussions may be found among
Christian philosophers and theologians. These common problems
provide a point of contact. But in order to build upon these
common issues to the point that Muslim theologians can address
the concerns of those immersed in secular culture, the aim in
reading what modern Christians have to say about the traditional
problems of theology must be to try to see why the traditional
arguments from their own tradition have come to seem inadequate,
and what steps they deem appropriate to remedy these
inadequacies.
It is of no use to come to the problems of Christian theology
with the smug confidence that they can all be solved by means of
the resources of the Islamic traditions of kalam, falsafah and `irja-n
. Likewise, there is no guarantee that the nation in possession
of the most valuable natural resources will be able to
effectively use those resources in order to pursue its own
political and economic objectives. We must learn how to use our
natural and intellectual resources effectively in the contexts
of the contemporary economic, political and intellectual
environments, and if we are to do this as Muslims, efficiency is
to be measured in units of accordance and submission to the
divine will. Neither economic power nor intellectual strength
has any value for the Muslim unless he is able to place them at
His service.
Once we come to understand what is novel in modern Christian
treatments of traditional problems of theology, and why these
novel elements have been adopted, our own Islamic theology will
be enriched, even if only to the extent of incorporating a
sufficient amount of new vocabulary to refute the modern ideas
we find unacceptable. This is a risky business, and its risks
need to be faced conscientiously. If we are to be successful at
it, we must remain critical at every stage of the process. No
doubt there will be some unfortunate souls who, in the attempt
to understand modern Christian thought about contemporary
theological issues, will be swept away in the currents of
thought that dominate the West. The worst way to learn is
through repetition of the mistakes of others. Our learning of
modern Western approaches to theological issues must be one
whereby we become conversant with the language of modern
religious concerns to the extent that we are able to express our
own ideas in the new language. It is of no use to repeat the
expressions of the language of modern Christian theology with an
Islamic accent. The language must be mastered, and fluency in
the language of modern Christian theology requires an effort no
less than that needed to master a new language. The stage at
which learning occurs through the repetition of stock phrases
has long since past.
In creative writing, the phrase finding one's voice is used for
the process of learning to master the techniques of writing to
the point that one is able to develop one's own style and
themes. Muslim theologians now have to find their own voices to
express their concerns and views. It is not enough even to
master the language of modern thought to the point of
professional proficiency. The pen must be wielded with a
flourish and beauty. However, as Muslims we have no desire to
join the cacophonous choir of so many modern writers who seek
their own voices for the sake of glorying in their own
individualities. Our aim is to use our newly found voices to
echo the refrains of the eternal divine message, so that the
attention of our listeners turns from our voices to the message
it carries.
So, the first step is to find common problems. This is easy.
Next, we are to read contemporary Christian responses to these
problems in order to gain fluency in the language of modern
religious thought in the Western world. This is difficult. After
that (or simultaneously), we can try to begin to understand the
new topics and problems and approaches to them to be found among
contemporary Christian thinkers: environmental ethics, the
social gospel, feminism, various topics of pastoral theology,
process theology, reformed epistemology, anti-realist theology,
and much more. No matter how difficult this is, it is absolutely
necessary for Muslims to begin exploring these issues. We need
to begin the task of trying to formulate answers to the
questions our children will soon be asking. In order for those
answers to have the degree of sophistication necessary to
satisfy young inquisitive minds, the urgency of these questions
in modern culture must be properly appreciated, the language in
which these questions are framed must be one in which we are
fluent, and we must be sufficiently well grounded in our own
traditions so that we are able to utilize that fluency to
articulate answers to the new questions grounded in the glorious
Qur'an and the teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be with
them), and we take refuge in Him, the Exalted, to preserve us
from
error.
[12] This school of thought is current among a group of Shi'i
scholars who argue for the separation (tafqiq) of theology from
philosophy.
[13] For a small sampling, see (2:219), (2:242), (2:266),
(3:191), (6:98), (7:176), (7:179), (9:81), (9:122), (10:24),
(12:2), (13:3),
(16:11), (30:8), (39:42), (59:21).
[14] Bihar al-Anwar, Vol. 1, p. 167.
[15] See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Qur'an and hadith as source
and inspiration of Islamic philosophy," in History of Islamic
Philosophy (2
vols.), Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, eds., (London:
Routledge, 1996), 27-39.
[16] (3:63).
[17] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1993).
[18] See David M. Wulff, Psychology of Religion (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1991), 204f.
Excerpted from Contemporary Topics of Islamic Thought by
Muhammad Legenhausen,Islamic Culture and Relations Organization
courtesy: Ali Abbas, New Jersey
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